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The objective of this paper is to assess the likely allocation effects of the current cli-
mate protection strategy as it is laid out in the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The multi-regional, multi-sectoral CGE-
model DART is used to simulate the effects of the current policies in the year 2012 
when the Kyoto targets need to be met. Different scenarios are simulated in order to 
highlight the effects of the grandfathering of permits to energy-intensive installations, 
the use of the project-based mechanisms (CDM and JI), and the restriction imposed by 
the supplementarity criterion. 
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  2 1. Introduction 
One of the major components of the European climate strategy aimed at 
reaching the European Kyoto targets is the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) for CO2. The ETS that started in January 2005, covers facilities 
in energy activities, the production, and processing of ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals, the mineral industry and the pulp, paper and board production, which 
are responsible for around 45% of European CO2-emissions. Besides trading 
emission allowances within the trading scheme, a linking between the ETS 
and the two flexible project mechanisms “Clean Development Mechanism” 
(CDM) and “Joint Implementation” (JI) has been established. This allows 
European facilities covered by the ETS to carry out emission-curbing projects 
in other Annex I countries (JI) and non-Annex I countries (CDM) and to convert 
the credits earned into emission allowances under the ETS.  
While the ETS guarantees that the emission targets of the ETS sectors are 
achieved at minimal costs, the efficiency of the overall climate strategy of the 
EU respectively the different European Member States depends crucially on 
the policies introduced outside the ETS. There are broadly three areas in 
which greenhouse gas emissions in the single Member States can be imple-
mented in order to meet the Kyoto-targets: 
1. Domestic  CO2-emission reductions in the ETS sectors 
2. Domestic  reductions of CO2-emissions in the sectors not covered by the 
ETS and reductions of other greenhouse gases (domestic reductions 
outside the ETS)  
3. Emission  reductions  abroad – mainly via CDM and JI since it is unclear 
whether international emissions trading in the first Kyoto commitment 
period from 2008-2012 will take place. 
The third option can be used by firms covered by the ETS as well as by gov-
ernments, which like to set less stringent domestic targets by avoiding emis-
sions abroad. 
  3 The allocation of permits to the ETS is subject of the so-called National Alloca-
tion Plans (NAPs), which each member state has to prepare before the be-
ginning of an ETS trading period. For the first trading period from 2005-2007, 
the final NAPs or at least drafts are now made public for all of the EU25 coun-
tries. In addition, the NAPs as well as some government programs contain in-
formation on the planned government purchase of CDM and JI credits. Some 
NAPs also indicate the targets for the ETS sectors until 2012. Given this in-
formation it is possible to determine how the different EU member states plan 
to achieve their Kyoto targets in terms of domestic reductions in and outside 
the ETS and reductions abroad.  
While existing simulation studies are based on hypothetical allowance alloca-
tion to the ETS and also ignore the possibility of using CDM and JI credits 
within the ETS and by European governments, the objective of this paper is to 
examine the implications of the current NAPs under different assumptions 
about the use and availability of CDM and JI credits using the DART model 
(Klepper et al. 2003). DART is a computable general equilibrium model de-
signed for the analysis of international climate policies and calibrated for the 
enlarged EU. With the help of simulations with DART, it will be possible to 
simulate the ETS, the CDM and JI market and the domestic action under dif-
ferent assumptions about the functioning of these three markets. Since the 
Kyoto targets are not binding for the former accession countries, except 
Slovenia, due to the economic recession in the 1990ies, the focus will be on 
the EU15. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we derive the current climate 
strategy towards the Kyoto targets of the different EU Member States and give 
some background information on the role of the ETS and the market potential 
of CDM and JI. Section 3 and 4 present the DART model, our simulation 
studies and interprets the simulation results. Section 5 concludes. 
  4 2.  Reaching the European Kyoto Targets 
In this section, we derive from the NAPs and other sources how the former 
EU15-countries plan to achieve the Kyoto targets by making use of the three 
options described in the introduction. In addition, we summarize past findings 
on the implications of the ETS, give an overview over the potential market for 
CDM and JI credits and finally discuss the issue of hot-air. The information 
gathered in this section can then be used to design the policy simulations and 
to interpret the results.  
2.1.  Distance to the European Kyoto Targets 
In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, the EU agreed to cut their overall GHG-emis-
sions relative to the 1990 level by 8% in the period from 2008-2012. In 1998, 
this target was differentiated between the different member states in the so-
called Burden Sharing Agreement giving cohesion member states, such as 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece, a lighter burden, compared to richer 
member states. The (former) accession countries that joined the EU in May 
2004 and those that are scheduled to join in 2007 are not part of the Burden 
Sharing Agreement but have their own individual Kyoto targets.  
Since then, greenhouse gas emissions have risen in most of the EU15-coun-
tries, and only few of the countries are on track to fulfill their commitments. 
Figure 1 shows the Kyoto targets for the EU15-countries as well as the change 
in GHG-emission from 1990 to 2002. As one can see, the gaps to the Kyoto 
targets are quite substantial in most countries. Only in Sweden, Great Britain 
and France, the 2002 GHG-emissions are below the Kyoto target and in Ger-
many only minor reductions are missing.  
With the exception of Slovenia, all of the (former) accession countries, where 
emission fell drastically since 1990 due to the economic break down of their 
economies, do not face any problems to reach their Kyoto targets. For these 
countries, the question is thus not how much to reduce in which sectors, but 
rather, how much of the excess emission rights (hot-air) to use.  
  5 Figure 1: Gaps to Kyoto Targets 
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2.2.  The European Climate Strategies 
The national climate strategies of the EU member states are summarized in 
the different National Allocation Plans (NAP). The NAPs contain information in 
different detail and with differing time horizons. Table A1 in the Appendix 
summarizes the information contained in the NAPs concerning the allocation 
to the ETS sectors, the emissions of these sectors and the use of CDM and 
JI
1. With the help of official data on GHG-emissions, it is possible to derive or 
estimate for all EU15-countries the emissions of the ETS and non-ETS sectors 
in 2002, the planned allocation to the ETS in 2007, the planned use of CDM 
and JI and the remaining reductions that have to be achieved to reach the 
Kyoto targets. Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and the UK have also in-
dicated the allocation to the ETS in 2012. Germany, the UK, and the Nether-
lands plan to reduce the ETS-emissions by 1.5 to 2.5%. Denmark is a special 
                                                            
1   The numbers on CDM and JI are taken from Lückge and Peterson (2004).  
  6 case since emissions in the ETS sectors can grow by about 10% between 
2002 and 2007 and then they need to be reduced by 26% between 2008 and 
2012. 
Figure 2 shows for each of the EU15 states in megatons of CO2 those re-
ductions relative to 2002 emissions that are necessary to reach the Kyoto tar-
get. The dark part of the bars shows the reduction (or increase) of the CO2-
emissions of the ETS sectors associated with the allowance allocation of the 
NAPs. Where available, these data are for the period 2008-12. In most cases, 
though, information is only available for 2005-07. The striped bars show the 
planned reductions via CDM and JI. These reductions will only be relevant for 
the first Kyoto commitment period from 2008-12. Given the Kyoto targets, the 
light bars show the necessary reductions in the sectors and gases not covered 
by the ETS. This residual can be influenced, of course, if the allocation of 
allowances in the second commitment period or the CDM and JI credits are 
adjusted accordingly. 
In line with Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that only France, the UK and Sweden al-
ready meet their Kyoto target in 2002. Nevertheless, the UK plans to reduce 
emissions in the ETS, which leaves room for rising emissions in the non-ETS 
sectors.  
Even though most countries have to reduce emissions considerably for 
meeting their Kyoto targets, Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Austria, the Nether-
lands and especially Italy allocate allowances to ETS sectors that surpass 
emissions in 2002. In the remaining countries, emission reductions in the ETS 
sector also play a minor role given the overall Kyoto target. Only Belgium 
plans to achieve a major part (about one third) of the reductions necessary for 
the Kyoto target within the ETS. CDM and JI are also of relatively little impor-
tance in most countries. In absolute numbers, the Nether lands and Spain plan 
to make use of these mechanisms most strongly. Each country plans to ac-
quire credits for around 20 MtCO2e per year in 2008 to 2012. CDM and JI are 
also part of the climate strategy in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Italy. Given 
  7 these reduction plans, the major burden for domestic reductions falls on the 
sectors outside the ETS in almost all countries. Only in the UK, Sweden and 
France, which are on track to fulfill their commitments, emissions outside the 
ETS, are allowed to rise. 
Figure 2: Climate Strategies in the EU15 According to the NAPs 
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2.3.  The Role of the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is intended to contribute to 
meeting the European Kyoto commitments in an economically efficient way. 
There is now some evidence that the ETS can indeed generate considerable 
cost savings.  
Klepper and Peterson (2004) show that the gains of the ETS compared to 
unilateral efficient action of all EU countries depend on how much CO2 is re-
  8 duced within the ETS compared to GHG reductions outside the ETS – that is 
in sectors and gases not covered by the ETS. Optimally designed, the ETS 
can reduce the welfare losses associated with the Kyoto Protocol by around 
20%. The resulting permit price is in this case around 11€/tCO2. Svendson and 
Vesterdal (2003) estimate that the ETS could reduce the total abatement costs 
by 32% compared to a system with no trading between member states.  
Estimates about permit prices in the ETS without accounting for the potential 
use of CDM and JI credits usually vary between 5 and 20€/tCO2. The so-called 
linking directive allows to convert CDM and JI credits into emission allowances 
under the ETS. Even though the first proposal of the directive envisaged to 
limit the use of CDM and JI credits to 6% of the total quantity of allowances 
allocated to the ETS, there are no limitations set in the final version. Govern-
ments though are required to consider the issue of supplementarity (see sec-
tion 2.4) in their twice-yearly reports and can set a limit for CDM and JI credits 
for each single installation. 
In January 2005 the trading price for allowances in the ETS was around 
8.5€/tCO2. On the other hand, there are estimates for the shadow taxes 
needed to achieve the necessary reductions outside the ETS, ignoring inter-
national emission trading or CDM and JI. In Klepper and Peterson (2004) 
these taxes are on average 22€/tCO2 but can reach almost 40€/tCO2 under a 
more generous allocation of allowances to the ETS sector.  
Existing studies have the shortcoming that they only analyze potential allow-
ance allocation since the NAPs were not known when the studies were un-
dertaken. More importantly, the studies ignore the possibility of using CDM 
and JI credits – by ETS firms and national governments.  
2.4.  Some Background on CDM and JI  
The project-based mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) have been designed to help countries to accomplish 
their Kyoto targets in an economically efficient and environmentally effective 
  9 way. JI allows Annex I Parties of the Kyoto Protocol to implement projects that 
reduce emissions in the territories of other Annex I parties and use the gen-
erated carbon credits to fulfill their Kyoto commitments. CDM gives the possi-
bility for emission reductions in developing (non-Annex I) countries which 
themselves have no reduction target.  
In the EU, it is possible to make use of CDM and JI on both the private and on 
the governmental level. Governments can use CDM and JI credits to comply 
with their national Kyoto reduction target. The Linking-Directive allows private 
entities that are covered by the EU ETS to convert credits from CDM and JI 
into allowances that can be used in the EU ETS.  
In the last years, the global market for carbon credits from project-based 
mechanisms has been steadily growing. The latest CDM & JI Monitor (2005) 
reports that 1306 proposed CDM and JI projects have so far been registered in 
Point Carbon’s project Database. Out of these, 271 Projects, potentially 
yielding 420 MtCO2e of emission reductions towards 2012, have reached the 
level of a Project Design Document (PDD). The latest World Bank report on 
the carbon market (Lecocq 2004) shows that since 1996 sales have doubled 
from around 40 MtCO2e to around 80 MtCO2e in 2003. In 2004, 64 MtCO2e 
have been exchanged through projects from January to May 2004 only, sug-
gesting that the market has doubled again by the end of the year 2004.  
A study for the World Bank (Haites and Seres 2004) summarizes information 
on the demand and supply of CDM and JI credits. Mainly based on modeling 
studies, the average annual demand from 2008 to 2012 for Kyoto units, ex-
cluding Australia and the US, is estimated to lie in the range of 600 to 
1150 MtCO2e. This includes AAU
2 transfers  as well as credits  from CDM & JI.  
                                                            
2   AAUs are the „Assigned Amount Units“ under the Kyoto Protocol – the amount of 
CO2 each Annex B country is allowed to emit in the first commitment period. The 
credits for CDM projects are denoted „Certified Emission Reductions“ (CERs) 
while the credits originating form JI projects are denoted „Emission Reduction 
Units“ (ERUs).  
  10 According to Natsource (2003)
3 the total demand for CDM and JI credits from 
industry will be 200 +-100 MtCO2e and the demand from the European ETS 
110 +- 65 MtCO2e. Governments are estimated to buy 84 to 762 MtCO2e p.a. 
from which the EU25 will demand 54 to 463 MtCO2e. Announced plans for 
government purchases amount to 70 MtCO2e p.a. in the EU25 (Lückge and 
Peterson 2004), 50 MtCO2e (including AAUs) in Canada, 95 MtCO2e in Japan 
and 5 to 18 MtCO2e in the EFTA countries.  
Haites and Seres (2004) also review studies on the supply of CDM and JI 
credits. Some studies use simulation models, which result in very flat marginal 
abatement cost curves and thus in a large supply of CDM and JI credits at low 
prices. Other curves are differentiated between project type and region and 
derived from the technical potentials. Haites and Seres conclude that the most 
conservative estimates yield annual reductions in 2010 in the range of 215 to 
405 MtCO2e at a price of 11 $/tCO2e +- 50%. Accounting for pre 2008 re-
ductions that can be used for the 2008-12 period, Haites and Seres see the 
most likely annual supply at 420 MtCO2e (range 270 to 505 MtCO2e) at a price 
of 11 $/tCO2e +- 50%. 
Taking the trade volumes from the World Bank (Lecocq 2004) and assuming 
that the market trend continues and that it needs four years to bring a project 
on the market (see Haites and Seres 2004), there is a potential of around 220 
MtCO2 per year. Since September 2004 the CDM & JI Monitor from Point Car-
bon also reports on a bi-weekly basis the proposed CDM and JI projects reg-
istered in the Point Carbons database, the number of projects that have 
reached the level of a project design document (PDD) and the resulting emis-
sion reductions. Assuming that all PDD projects are actually validated so far 
84 MtCO2e p.a. are available for 2008-2012. How many credits for 2008-2012 
will be available in the end depends very much on the kind of market trend that 
is assumed. Under a linear trend, around 300 to 400 MtCO2 p.a. will be avail-
able while under an exponential trend it may well be twice as much. Two 
                                                            
3   This study is reported in Haites and Seres (2004) but not available for the authors 
of this paper.  
  11 simple calculations also show the range of possible supply. Assuming that as 
in the past four month, every month around 6.5 MtCO2 are validated and that it 
takes again four years until a project is running, there is a potential supply of 
around 290 MtCO2 p.a. Assuming that all proposed projects will be validated 
and continue to gain an average of 1.5 MtCO2 and that continuously 50 pro-
jects are proposed and validated every month, there is a potential supply of 
700 MtCO2. In summary, evidence suggests that the minimum supply of CDM 
and JI credits is around 200 MtCO2 p.a. and that it seems unlikely that it will be 
far above 600 MtCO2 p.a. 
When making assumptions about the supply of CDM and JI credits, it has to 
be taken into account that institutional issues constitute significant barriers to a 
more widespread use. Currently institutional capacities are unevenly distrib-
uted among potential CDM host countries, and this is likely to remain so. While 
there is significant capacity in many Asian and South American countries, 
many African countries still lack behind (Ellis et al. 2004). 
Concerning the prices for credits, the World Bank and the OECD see prices in 
the range of 2.5 to 6 €/tCO2e (Lecocq 2004, Ellis et al. 2004). Some EU ten-
ders contracted CDM and JI credits for 2.5 to 8.5 €/tCO2e (Lückge and 
Peterson 2004). The CDM and JI Monitor of Point Carbon reports 5 to 
15 €/tCO2e. 
One problem for deriving prices, e.g. from a simulation model, is the existence 
of transaction costs for CDM and JI projects. In a survey Michaelowa et al. 
(2003) report transaction cost ranching from a few €-cent per tCO2e up to 
more than 1000 €/tCO2e depending on the project size and type. There is evi-
dence that transaction costs should not be more than 25% of proceeds from 
permit sales in order to make a project viable. At current prices this would give 
a cost threshold of about 1 €/tCO2e.  
Another important issue that influences the demand for CDM and JI credits is 
the so-called supplementarity requirement. As laid out in the Marrakech Ac-
cords to the Kyoto Protocol “the use of the mechanisms [International Emis-
  12 sions Trading, CDM, JI] shall be supplemental to domestic action and that do-
mestic action shall thus constitute a significant effort made by each Party in-
cluded in Annex I to meet its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, Paragraph 1.”  It was in fact the EU that insisted 
on the inclusion of this requirement and also unsuccessfully pressed for a limit 
requiring that not more than roughly 50% of the reduction should be imported 
(see Langrock and Sterk 2004 for the discussion on the supplementarity 
issue). In principle, the supplementarity requirement holds for each of the 
EU25 member states as well as for the former EU15. Table A1 in the appendix 
includes the calculations of the EU for the maximum amount of credits that are 
allowed under the above mentioned supplementarity criterion. 
2.5.  The Role of Hot-Air 
So far, the possibility of obtaining carbon credits from CDM and JI projects has 
been introduced. In addition, the Kyoto-Protocol allows the transfer of AAUs 
between Annex B countries. As far as trade in AAUs between countries with a 
binding cap is concerned, this option is of minor importance since the project 
credits are perfect substitutes and can in many cases be obtained at lower 
prices. This is not the case for countries, which do have a cap that is above 
their expected business-as-usual emissions in 2012. These excess emission 
rights are called hot-air. The countries with hot-air are mainly the countries of 
the Former Soviet Union and to a smaller degree the Eastern European coun-
tries. In an extreme scenario where these countries sell all their hot-air, most 
models, including DART (Klepper and Peterson 2003) predict that the excess 
supply of allowances is so large that the carbon price falls to zero and the 
Kyoto targets can be reached at zero cost, however without an emission re-
duction. Such a scenario is not very likely though. Different studies have esti-
mated that it is optimal for the hot-air countries to restrict their sales of hot-air 
to around 40% (Haites and Seres 2004, Klepper and Peterson 2003). If some 
of the hot-air is supplied on the market, the use of CDM and JI credits will be 
reduced and international carbon prices will fall. 
  13 The role of this Kyoto-trading for the ETS is rather limited since the AAUs can-
not be used by installations inside the ETS. In addition, the governments of the 
member states have committed themselves to a strict definition of supple-
mentarity and have opposed the use of hot-air for achieving the Kyoto-targets. 
Hot-air is therefore not considered in this paper. 
3.  Simulating the ETS and the Role of CDM and JI 
To assess the effects of the current NAPs and the potential role of CDM and JI 
credit for the European Union, we use the DART-model (Klepper et al. 2003). 
Below, we first shortly characterize the model and then derive the policy sce-
narios for the simulation study. 
3.1.  The DART Model 
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-
sector recursive dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation 
of the European ETS, it is calibrated to an aggregation of 26 regions. Table 1 
lists the 17 countries or group of countries of the EU including the accession 
countries of Eastern Europe and nine other world regions that represent the 
rest of the world. 
In each region or country, the economy is disaggregated into 12 sectors 
(Table 2). Four of these sectors participate in the ETS. Although there is no 
perfect match between the installations subject to the ETS and the sectoral 
structure of DART, the deviations are relatively small. 
The economy in each region is modeled as a competitive economy with flex-
ible prices and market clearing. There exist three types of agents: a represen-
tative consumer, a representative producer in each sector, and regional gov-
ernments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows. The DART-
model has a recursive-dynamic structure solving for a sequence of static one-
period equilibria. The major exogenous drivers are the rate of productivity 
growth, the savings rate, the rate of change of the population, and the change 
in human capital. 
  14 Table 1: Regions in DART 
European Union 
AUT Austria  IRE  Ireland 
BEN Belgium,  Luxembourg  ITA  Italy 
DEU Germany  NED Netherlands 
DNK Denmark  PRT Portugal 
ESP Spain  SWE  Sweden 
FIN Finland  UK  United Kingdom 
FRA France  HUN Hungary 
GRC Greece  POL  Poland 
XCE*  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
Other Annex B Countries   Non-Annex B Countries 
USA  United States of America  MEA  Middle East, North Africa 
AUS Australia  LAM Latin  America 
FSU*  Former Soviet Union  CPA  China, Hong-Kong 
OAB  Rest Annex B (Canada, Iceland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland) 
IND India 
XCE includes Bulgaria and Romania for which the accession in 2007 is planned. It excludes the Baltic 
Countries, which are aggregated in region FSU, as well as Malta and Cyprus, which are aggregated in 
region ROW. This is due to the regional disaggregation of the GTAP5 data set. This inconsistency has 
only a small effect since it distorts CO2-emissions of ACC by less than 5%. 
 
 
Table 2: Sector Structure of the Economies 
ETS-sectors Other  sectors 
OIL  Refined Oil Products  COL   Coal Extraction 
EGW Electricity  GAS Natural  Gas Production & Distribution 
IMS  Iron, Metal, Steel  CRU  Crude Oil 
PPP  Pulp & Paper Products  CEP  Chemical Products 
   AGR  Agricultural  Products 
   TRN  Transport  Industries 
   MOB  Transportation  Services 
    OTH  Other Manufactures & Services 
 
  15 The model is calibrated to the GTAP5 database that represents production 
and trade data for 1997. The elasticities of substitution for the energy goods 
coal, gas, and crude oil are calibrated in such a way as to reproduce the emis-
sion projections of the EIA (EIA 2002). For a more detailed description of the 
DART model, see Springer (2002) or Klepper et al. (2003).  
3.2.  Policy Scenarios for the ETS  
For assessing the likely impact of the recently introduced emissions trading 
scheme and project-based mechanisms, a “business-as-usual” (BAU) ref-
erence scenario is determined. This BAU scenario includes the climate policy 
measures introduced until the year 2002. Hence, it includes the impact of pol-
icies such as the German eco-tax or the national emissions trading schemes. 
From 2003 on, BAU keeps these policies in place but does not include any 
new climate policies. The implications of the BAU scenario for the NAP targets 
are discussed in section 4.1. 
The BAU scenario is then compared to several policy scenarios with which an 
assessment of the mix of current policies can be made. The first scenario con-
sists of simulating the impact of the NAPs and the European ETS without the 
use of CDM and JI projects. The targets in the non-ETS sectors are reached 
by a uniform, but regionally differentiated CO2-tax. This scenario is called 
NoCDM. It helps to illustrate how the burden of the Kyoto targets is distributed 
between the ETS and the non-ETS in the different national NAPs. It also 
serves as a reference for the impact of the project based mechanisms. The re-
sults of scenario NoCDM are discussed in section 4.2.  
The second scenario is designed to capture the national climate policies with 
respect to CO2 on the basis of both the ETS and the project-based mecha-
nisms. It is denoted LimCDM and incorporates all the national policy plans 
made public so far. Thus, there is no restriction for the use of CDM and JI in 
the ETS, while the national governments only import limited amounts of CDM 
and JI credits. We furthermore assume that all CDM and JI credits are associ-
  16 ated with transaction cost of 3 €/tCO2, which is above the estimated long run 
transaction costs of around 1€/tCO2 but far below the transaction cost in some 
of the smaller projects. Further assumptions, e.g. concerning the CDM and JI 
demand from the remaining Annex B countries, are described in the Appendix. 
Scenario LimCDM illustrates the contribution of the project-based mechanism 
to the Kyoto targets given the ETS within the EU. The results are discussed in 
section 4.3.  
The third scenario derives the optimal solution by letting the ETS work without 
restrictions and by allowing all sectors the use of CDM and JI to the degree 
they wish. This scenario OPT differs from LimCDM in that the national restric-
tions on the use of project based emission credits are withdrawn. It is dis-
cussed in section 4.4. Finally, the last scenario is SUP where the optimal 
emission reductions and CDM/JI purchases for the non-ETS and ETS sectors 
are restricted by the supplementarity requirements in each region.  
All scenarios are explained in detail in the Appendix.  
4. Simulation  Results 
The simulation results of the different scenarios are derived from running the 
DART-model over the entire period from 1997 to 2012 when the Kyoto targets 
will be binding. Therefore, only the final results for 2012 are reported in the 
subsequent figures and tables. All prices are denoted in EUROS of the year 
2000.  
4.1.  Implications of the BAU Scenario 
Whereas in Figure 2 above the necessary reductions of CO2-emissions rela-
tive to the emissions in 2002 are indicated, the reduction requirements should 
actually be determined by computing the difference between the BAU-emis-
sions in 2012 and the emission caps of that year as given by the Burden 
Sharing Agreement of the EU. Figure 3 illustrates the results. For each coun-
try/region the necessary reduction relative to BAU are decomposed into those 
  17 within the ETS and those outside the ETS. In addition, the overall reduction 
requirements are presented. 
Figure 3: CO2-Reduction Necessary to Meet the Kyoto Targets Relative to 
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Since the emissions of the ETS sectors grow faster than the emissions of the 
non-ETS sectors in the BAU scenario, the targets from the NAPs imply that 
considerable reduction efforts in the ETS sectors are needed in order to meet 
the targets in 2012. Nevertheless, the reduction requirements in the non-ETS 
sectors are in most cases larger than in the ETS. It is therefore likely that the 
NAPs do not minimize the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets. This is analyzed 
in the following sections. 
4.2.  The ETS without CDM and JI 
The first scenario looks at the outcome of the climate policy measures laid out 
in the National Allocation Plans (NAP) but leaves the project-based 
mechanism outside the system. This NoCDM scenario has emissions trading 
  18 within the ETS according to the caps as they are defined in the NAPs. It is as-
sumed that each government imposes an emission tax on all emissions out-
side the ETS at a level that makes sure that the Kyoto target is met. 
Whereas the ETS equalizes marginal abatement costs across countries in the 
energy intensive sectors, the distortions between the ETS-sectors and the rest 
of the economy within each country remain untouched. The degree of that 
distortion, of course, depends on the amount of allowances allocated to the 
ETS relative to the Kyoto target. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where the permit 
price in the ETS is compared to the tax that needs to be imposed outside the 
ETS for meeting the Kyoto target. In order to illustrate the distortions imposed 
by the generous allocation of allowances to the ETS, Figure 4 also shows the 
tax that would emerge without the ETS. In this case, the international effic-
iency gains from the ETS cannot be realized but the intersectoral marginal 
abatement costs in each economy are equalized. The light gray bars denoted 
UNI indicate the marginal abatement costs if each country were to meet its 
Kyoto target unilaterally. 
It turns out that in the unilateral scenario the implicit taxes vary between 5 €/t 
CO2 in France and Greece and around 60 €/tCO2 in Denmark and Ireland. The 
emission weighted average tax in the EU15 is around 20 €/tCO2. This indi-
cates both strongly varying reduction requirements in the EU15 member 
countries and a significant potential for welfare gains through emissions trad-
ing.  
In the NoCDM scenario the ETS with the official NAP targets is simulated and 
results in an equilibrium allowance price of 8.6 €/tCO2. This low permit price is 
partly due to the efficiency gains from trading but also due to the generous al-
location of allowances to the ETS. It is therefore not surprising that the implicit 
taxes outside the ETS rise far above the unilateral scenario UNI. In fact, the 
emission weighted average tax outside the ETS is 57 €/tCO2, but reaches ex-
tremely high levels in countries like Austria, Denmark, Spain, and Italy. 








































The welfare effects of the two scenarios illustrate the trade off between effic-
iency gains through trading and the intersectoral distortions within each coun-
try. Whereas the emissions trading scheme provides efficiency gains, these 
are apparently netted out for many countries by the additional distortions im-
posed by the inefficient internal caps on the ETS and non-ETS-sectors. A 
comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 5 supports this. Countries with a large 
divergence between allowance price and implicit tax in the non-ETS sectors, 
such as Austria, Spain, and Italy experience a strong negative welfare effect 
through the ETS. On the opposite side, in France, Greece and the UK, the 
ETS-sectors are more restricted than the non-ETS sectors, leading to neglig-
ible welfare effects.  






























However, there is one country where the efficiency gains from the ETS out-
weigh the distortions from different marginal abatement costs, that is Denmark. 
The implicit tax in the unilateral scenario is 60 €/t CO2 whereas the ETS has 
less than 10 €/t CO2. These gains seem to outweigh the distortions between 
sectors. The welfare costs in the NoCDM scenario are therefore lower than in 
the unilateral case (see Figure 5).  
Turning to the trade with emission allowances in the ETS, the picture has 
changed compared to the allocation rules that were proposed by the EU 
Commission and that have been analyzed in Klepper and Peterson (2004)
4. 
While under the least-cost orientated emission targets the ETS turned out to 
be a rather lopsided affair in the sense that the accession countries would be 
                                                            
4   Some differences also stem from the fact that in Klepper and Peterson (2004) 
some EU regions were aggregated. Also, in this paper the targets account for 
reductions in other greenhouse gases, which was not the case in Klepper and 
Peterson (2004).  
  21 the only exporters of allowances, Figure 6 shows that under the current NAPs 
seven of the EU15-countries become exporters as well. 

































While the exports of Spain, Finland, Portugal and Sweden are negligible, 
France, Greece, the Netherlands and especially Italy export 5 to 17 MtCO2 in 
2012. This is partly the case because these countries are close to meeting 
their Kyoto targets (France, Greece), but partly because of the generous allo-
cation of allowances in the NAPs of Netherlands and Italy that allow emissions 
in the ETS sectors to rise. It is worth mentioning that the Italian NAP has not 
been accepted by the EU commission and is under revision. Nevertheless, the 
main exporters of allowances are still the Eastern European countries.  
As Figure 6 shows the trade in allowances in absolute quantities, the size of a 
country dominates trade flows. For example, Germany’s ETS sectors account 
for almost one quarter of the total European trading scheme. Hence, Germany 
is the largest importer with imports of around 45 MtCO2 in 2012. 
  22 This picture changes when one looks at the import shares of allowances rela-
tive to total emissions. Countries with high marginal abatement costs like 
Denmark and Ireland rely strongly on imports. Relative to their emissions the 
largest importers are Denmark and Ireland where 60% and 23% of the emis-
sion of the ETS sectors are covered by imported allowances. The ETS sectors 
in Germany and the UK import allowances for around 11% of their emissions.  
4.3.  The Current Climate Strategy of the EU  
The previous section has illustrated how the separation of the energy intensive 
installations in the ETS from the other sectors can lead to significant distor-
tions, especially if the ETS sectors become endowed with a large share of 
CO2-emissions allowed under the Kyoto-protocol. Some of these distortions 
can be alleviated through CDM and JI activities. The project-based 
mechanisms allow governments to relieve the pressure that is imposed on the 
non-ETS sectors by the generous allocation of emission allowances to the en-
ergy intensive installations. They also lower the allowance prices within the 
ETS since cheap CDM and JI credits can be bought from companies in the 
ETS as well. The amount of project credits that governments will buy is re-
stricted by the supplementarity criterion to which all member states have sub-
scribed. In this section the scenario LimCDM is computed. It allows installa-
tions in the ETS to buy any quantity of credits they wish while the governments 
buy only the amount of credits they have announced. Table A1 in the Appen-
dix summarizes the amounts of CDM and JI credits which the different gov-
ernments want to acquire.  
The results of scenario LimCDM are summarized in Figure 7, which also 
documents as a reference the results of the scenario NoCDM without project-
based mechanisms. In LimCDM the import of project credits reduces the per-
mit prices in the ETS to 5.7 €/tCO2. At the same time, the implicit carbon prices 
in the sectors outside the ETS fall because the government purchases of 
credits reduce the emission restriction in these sectors. 








































Figure 7 shows that these purchases reduce the inefficiencies imposed by the 
NAPs that were discussed in the last section and reduce the gap between the 
allowance price in the ETS and the implicit taxes in the non-ETS sectors. This 
is especially true for those countries that plan to make considerable use of 
CDM and JI credits. Austria, Denmark, Spain Ireland and the Netherlands can 
reduce the marginal abatement cost in the non-ETS sectors by 40 to 60% 
compared to the NoCDM scenario. In Italy and Belgium, the implicit taxes fall 
by around 20%. In Germany, Finland and Portugal, where the governments 
only plan minor (or even zero) purchases of CDM and JI credits, the implicit 
taxes are not much affected. Altogether, the limited use of the project-based 
mechanisms still leaves implicit taxes in the non-ETS sectors at levels be-
tween 30 and 110 €/tCO2, compared to an allowance price that has dropped to 
5.7 €/tCO2. In addition, substantial differences in marginal abatement costs 
between countries remain in the non-ETS sectors. 
  24 Turning now to the likely welfare effects of the current climate strategies of the 
EU member states, in Figure 8 the welfare costs of the LimCDM scenario are 
compared to the situation without the ETS (i.e. scenario UNI) and with ETS but 
without CDM and JI projects (i.e. scenario NoCDM). Whereas a unilateral 
achievement of the Kyoto targets would lead to an average welfare loss of 
0.7% in the EU15, this loss rises to 1.7% when the ETS is introduced. The ad-
dition of CDM and JI projects lowers it again to 0.9%. Hence, some but not all 
of the distortions of the ETS can be compensated. Those countries that plan to 
acquire the largest amounts of CDM and JI credits can decrease their negative 
welfare effects most strongly. This is most obvious in Spain and the Nether-
lands that both plan to acquire 20 MtCO2 from CDM and JI projects p.a. As a 
result, the negative welfare effects are in these countries at least reduced to 
the level of unilateral efficient action.  






























  25 Figure 9 shows the trade flows of CDM and JI credits worldwide. For better 
readability, the CDM and JI purchases of the EU15 are aggregated. Alto-
gether, the EU15-countries acquire 226 MtCO2 through CDM and JI. The 
region OAB (other Annex B countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol) are re-
stricted to a maximum of purchases of another 200 MtCO2. This is a little more 
then 50% of the reductions relative to the BAU-emission in 2012 that are nec-
essary to reach the Kyoto target and thus an upper estimate of the supple-
mentarity requirement. 
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Concerning the host-countries of CDM projects, about 65% of the CDM allow-
ances are covered by emission reductions in China, followed by the FSU, India 
and MEA, responsible for around 8 to 15%. Altogether, the size of the CDM 
and JI market is within the range of estimates presented in section 2.4. How-
ever, the distribution of CDM projects across developing countries does not 
reflect the currently planned projects that are mainly located in Latin America, 
while only few projects are hosted by China and India (Lückge and Peterson 
2004).  
  26 Figure 10 shows the allowance flows in the EU in more detail. Negative bars 
for the ETS sectors indicate that these sectors would sell allowances within the 
ETS. This is true only for the ETS sectors in the Rest of Eastern Europe (XCE) 
and Italy. Positive bars for the ETS sectors indicate that these sectors buy al-
lowances, either within the ETS or as credits from CDM and JI projects. The 
sales inside the ETS are rather small (around 36 MtCO2), most of the allow-
ances (around 150 MtCO2) originate from CDM and JI projects. The ranking of 
buyers remains quite the same as in the scenario NoCDM without CDM and 
JI, only that due to cheap CDM and JI credits some countries who have for-
merly been allowances sellers now become buyers.  






































Negative bars for the non-ETS sectors stand for JI projects in Annex B coun-
tries. Only 0.3 MtCO2 JI reductions would be undertaken in Eastern Europe. 
This is due to the cheap abatement opportunities in the developing countries 
and sensitive to the level of transaction cost associated with the project-based 
mechanisms. The positive non-ETS bars finally show the governmental pur-
chases of CDM and JI credits as announced in the NAPs (altogether around 
76 MtCO2). 
  27 As discussed in section 2.4, the Kyoto Protocol requires that the use of CDM 
and JI shall be supplemental to domestic action. The EU has voted for a strict 
definition of this supplementarity criterion, and continues to stress its impor-
tance. It is thus an interesting question how the CDM and JI purchases shown 
in Figure 10 compare to the limits set by the supplementarity requirement. For 
this reason, estimates of these limits (as calculated by the EU, see section 2.4) 
are added as horizontal lines.  
Figure 10 shows that there is little need to further restrict the CDM and JI pur-
chases in the ETS in order to stay within the limits of the supplementarity 
criterion in most countries. In The Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Denmark 
where the government plans to acquire the largest amount of CDM and JI 
credits the limits are slightly exceeded. The only countries that might have to 
rigorously restrict their ETS sectors in the use of CDM and JI are Germany 
and the UK. On the other hand, there is in some countries such as Austria, 
Finland and Italy the potential for larger government purchases of CDM and JI 
credits, which would further reduce the welfare costs of meeting the Kyoto tar-
gets. Overall, most countries come close to the supplementarity limit with the 
given plans to purchase CDM and JI credits and without controlling their ETS-
sectors.  
Altogether there are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the sce-
nario LimCDM. First, the project-based mechanism lead to some cost savings 
compared to a situation without emission reductions abroad. Second, the cur-
rent European climate strategy is not efficient since it leads to a large wedge 
between the marginal abatement cost in the ETS sectors (the allowance price) 
and the marginal abatement costs (the implicit tax necessary to reach the 
overall Kyoto targets) in the non-ETS sectors. Third, in most countries the 
supplementarity criterion does not allow to close this wedge by further gov-
ernmental purchases of CDM and JI credits at least not without restricting the 
use of those credits for the ETS sectors.  
  28 4.4.  Making Optimal Use of CDM and JI 
In the last section, it was illustrated that even a restricted use of CDM and JI 
can reduce the costs of meeting the European Kyoto targets considerably. In 
this section we remove the restriction on the governmental use of the project 
based mechanisms and also ignore the supplementarity requirements to ana-
lyze the cost minimizing use of CDM and JI in the scenario denoted OPT.  
In this case, the unrestricted use of CDM and JI throughout Europe leads to an 
equalization of the carbon prices worldwide. Thus, the wedge between the im-
plicit tax in the non-ETS sectors and the allowance price in the EU ETS is 
closed. The only exceptions are those countries that do not need to reduce 
emissions in the non-ETS sectors, which are the UK, France, Greece, Sweden 
and the Eastern European countries. Here, the implicit carbon tax is zero. The 
international carbon price would be 6.8 €/tCO2.
5 It turns out that the un-
restricted use of the project-based mechanisms implies that the European 
Kyoto targets can be reached basically without any negative welfare effects. In 
fact, in almost all countries the welfare changes relative to o business-as-usual 
are close to zero. The welfare effects for the different countries are shown in 
Figure 13, where the welfare effects of all different scenarios are compared.  
Figure 11 shows the international allowance flows under the OPT scenario. 
Again, the EU15 is for better readability aggregated to one region. Compared 
to the LimCDM scenario, the European purchases of CDM and JI credits have 
increased by more than 60% to 400 MtCO2. The other Annex B countries have 
more than doubled their demand. Altogether, the project-based mechanisms 
now have a volume of around 880 MtCO2. China remains the single largest 
host country of CDM and JI projects as before in the LimCDM scenario.  
                                                            
5  Theoretically, the countries with a zero implicit carbon tax could supply JI credits. 
This possibility is excluded for The EU15 countries, since there is no empirical 
evidences for this to take place. In addition, the amounts supplied would be 
negligable. In Estern Europe, the model allows for JI (see Figure 11). 





















EEU = Eastern Europe 
Figure 12 shows the allowance flows in the EU25. Since the higher demand 
for CDM and JI credits has driven up the price of CDM and JI allowances, the 
purchases of the ETS sectors have overall decreased by 40% compared to the 
LimCDM scenario. They now sum up to 94 MtCO2. In contrast, the sales of al-
lowances within the ETS have increased by 45% to 52 MtCO2. The govern-
mental purchases to be used in the non-ETS sectors are on average 2.5 times 
larger than in scenario LimCDM and reach 270 MtCO2. The largest relative in-
creases can be seen in Germany, followed with some distance by Finland, 
Italy and Ireland. The Eastern European countries now sell 7.7 MtCO2 JI 
credits.  
Except for France, Greece and Sweden, no country meets the supplementarity 
requirement in this scenario. It turns out to be optimal to buy 1.4 to 2.5 times 
as much CDM and JI credits than allowed by the supplementarity criterion. 
This implies that only minor emission reductions (2 to 5% relative to BAU in 
2012) are undertaken domestically. 

































The optimality of the NAPs is not an issue if there is an unrestricted use of 
CDM and JI credits. In this case, the same single international price will 
emerge independent of the allocation to the ETS, and from an allocational 
point of view, the NAPs are irrelevant. The allocation to the ETS sectors de-
termines though, how much CDM and JI credits are bought by governments 
and how many enter the ETS. Thus, it is a question of how the cost of meeting 
the Kyoto targets are distributed between the governments and thus tax 
payers on one side and the industry on the other side.  
Instead of searching for an optimum through unrestricted CDM and JI activities 
given the allocation of allowances to ETS and non-ETS sectors, one can seek 
the optimal allocation of allowances to the ETS sector given the supplemen-
tarity requirement. In this scenario, SUP, there is full European emissions 
trading in all sectors and limited purchases of CDM and JI credits to stay within 
the limit of the supplementarity requirement. This results in cost minimizing 
emissions in the non-ETS and ETS sectors, which can then be compared to 
  31 the current targets. This is done in Table 3. Table 3 reports in the first three 
columns the composition of emissions between ETS and non-ETS sectors and 
the allocation of project credits to these sectors. The numbers are derived from 
the LimCDM scenario for 2012 that projects current policy objectives as out-
lined in the NAPs. Columns 4 to 6 show the same numbers for the SUP sce-
nario where emissions can be freely traded between all sectors but the sup-
plementarity restrictions on project credits are kept economy wide.  
Table 3: Comparison of Current Policies to Optimal Policies (in percent) 
Emissions in LimCDM  
rel. to Kyoto target 
Optimal emissions  

















AUT  58.1= 55.1 + 3.0  53.0= 44.9 + 8.1  11.1  48.8  69.0  17.8 
BEN  36.1= 29.8 + 6.2  73.2= 70.2 + 3.0  9.2  32.0  76.6  8.5 
DEU  53.1= 44.5 + 8.6   55.6= 55.5 + 0.1  8.7  47.9  59.3  7.1 
DNK  90.6= 50.9+ 39.7   57.7=  49.1+ 8.6  48.3  71.1  71.8  42.9 
ESP  56.7= 52.7 + 4.0  55.9= 47.3 + 8.6  12.6  46.0  65.6  11.6 
FIN  67.8= 65.7 + 2.1   34.8= 34.3 + 0.5   2.6  61.3  43.3  4.6 
FRA  22.8= 22.5 + 0.2   77.5 = 77.5 + 0.0  0.2  24.4  75.6  0.0 
GRC  52.3= 51.4 + 0.9   48.6 = 48.6 + 0.0   0.9  54.9  45.1  0.0 
IRL  62.5= 49.0+13.9  62.9= 51.0+ 11.9  25.4  49.2  66.2  15.4 
ITA  52.5= 54.3 - 1.7  48.4= 45.7 + 2.7  1.0  44.4  65.2  9.6 
NLD  42.6= 41.7+ 0.9   66.8 = 58.3 + 8.5  9.4  35.6  71.7  7.3 
PRT  56.2= 52.2 + 4.0  47.8= 47.8 + 0.0  4.0  49.1  55.8  4.9 
SWE  30.2= 28.5 + 1.8   71.5= 71.5 + 0.0  1.8  34.6  63.0  0.0 
UK  41.8= 34.5 + 6.3   65.5= 65.5 + 0.0  6.3    41.4 59.8 1.2 
(1)+(2)-(3) = 100%. 
(4)+(5)-(6) = 100% (Sweden overcomplies with Kyoto). 
For Sweden, UK and France the suppl. criterion is non-binding. 
 
 
  32 A comparison of columns 1 and 4 reveals that most countries have endowed 
the ETS sectors too generously with emission permits. In addition, according 
to the announced government purchases for CDM and JI credits to many pro-
ject credits go into the ETS sectors. Only France, Greece, Sweden, and the 
UK did not oversupply their ETS sectors. An extreme case is Denmark where 
because of a relatively small endowment with allowances the ETS sectors 
would buy large amounts of project credits. The maximum share of CDM and 
JI credits under the supplementarity restriction is shown in column 6. Com-
pared to the expected purchases of credits (column 3) Denmark, Ireland, and 
the UK would have difficulties to meet these targets because of large pur-
chases of ETS installations. Countries like Austria and Italy that have given 
generous endowments of allowances to the ETS sectors will stay well under 
the supplementarity limit because of little demand from these sectors.  
Figure 13 finally shows the welfare implications of the optimal strategy under 
supplementarity (SUP) compared to the current situation (LimCDM). It includes 
also the welfare effects of an unrestricted use of CDM and JI (OPT).  
The optimal allocation of allowances and CDM/JI purchases in the SUP sce-
nario leads only to minor welfare effects relative to a BAU scenario (-0.2% in 
the EU15) and comes very close to the minimal welfare losses under a sce-
nario without any restrictions on the CDM/JI purchases. Thus, even though the 
supplementarity requirement slightly increases the welfare costs associated 
with meeting the European Kyoto targets, it is more important to get an optimal 
allocation of reduction targets between ETS and non-ETS sectors that can 
avoid the large welfare losses associated with the current allocation.  
  33 Figure 13: Welfare Effects of the Scenarios LimCDM, OPT, and SUP  































4.5. Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to Transaction Costs of CDM and 
JI 
One critical assumption in this study is the level of transaction costs associ-
ated with CDM and JI projects. It was assumed that the level is 3€/tCO2. For a 
sensitivity analysis the LimCDM scenario has been run with different levels of 
transaction cost ranging from 0 to 6€/tCO2. 
Since different transaction costs primarily show up in the international allow-
ance markets, Figure 14 shows the CDM and JI purchases of the EU as well 
as the allowance price in the ETS. The CDM and JI purchases are shown on 
the left axis. They fall linearly with rising transaction costs. The allowance price 
in the ETS is shown on the right axis. It rises almost linearly with rising trans-
action cost.  
  34 Figure14: EU Purchases of CDM and JI Credits and ETS Allowance Prices 
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The amount of CDM and JI purchases decreases by 60% when the transac-
tion costs are raised from zero to 6 €/tCO2. The allowance prices increase by 
only 5.2 €/tCO2 even though the transaction cost rise by 6.0 €, since the re-
duced CDM and JI demand offsets some of the increase. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have analyzed the effects of the current National Allocation 
Plans (NAPs) for the European emissions trading scheme (ETS) by focusing 
on the allocation effects of meeting the European Kyoto targets in 2012. 
Special attention is given to the role of CDM and JI projects within the national 
climate strategies. 
The current NAPs generously endow the ETS sectors with emission rights and 
thus require large emission reductions outside the ETS sectors – either do-
mestically in the non-ETS sectors or abroad making use of CDM and JI 
credits. In the first simulation without the use of CDM and JI credits it becomes 
apparent that the NAPs drive a large wedge between the allowance price in 
the ETS and the implicit tax necessary for reaching the Kyoto targets in the 
  35 non-ETS sectors. This inefficiency is important enough to make the welfare 
costs of meeting the Kyoto targets even larger than under an efficient uni-
lateral action. All gains through international emissions trading are netted out 
by the distortions created between the ETS and the non-ETS sectors within 
each economy.  
Making use of the option to buy CDM and JI credits, both by ETS sectors and 
by governments indeed reduces the cost of meeting the European Kyoto tar-
gets. We have analyzed a scenario where the use of CDM and JI credits is un-
restricted for the ETS sectors, but were the government purchases are re-
stricted to the official plans. In this scenario, there still remains in most coun-
tries a large difference between the allowance price in the ETS of 5.7 €/tCO2 
and the implicit tax necessary to achieve the necessary reductions in the non-
ETS sectors of 30 to 110 €/tCO2.  
Thus, while the use of CDM and JI drives down the allowance price in the ETS 
by one third and reduces the wedge between implicit tax outside the ETS and 
the allowance price, and thus reduces the costs of meeting the European 
Kyoto targets compared to a situation without the project-based mechanism, 
the distortions created by the uneven NAPs can not be eliminated. The welfare 
cost of the current emission targets and policies is larger than under a situation 
of unilaterally efficient action.  
The supplementarity requirement of the Kyoto Protocol to achieve major parts 
of the emission reductions domestically, negatively affects the cost of reaching 
the Kyoto targets. Whereas the current policies will have a welfare loss of 
close to 1% in 2012 relative to “business-as-usual” policy an unrestricted 
trading in project credits and allowances would result in an allocation where 
the Kyoto targets can be met with hardly any welfare costs. Altogether, given 
the current NAPs, the European ETS sectors buy around 150 MtCO2 of CDM 
and JI credits and the governments add another 75 MtCO2. On the other side, 
only minor amounts of allowances (36 MtCO2) are traded within the ETS. The 
  36 only sellers of allowances are in this case some Eastern European countries 
and Italy. 
The best strategy to reduce the costs of the current European climate strat-
egies is to reduce the burden for the non-ETS sectors. This can be achieved 
by setting stricter targets for the ETS installations and by restricting the use of 
CDM and JI for the ETS installations. The first measure directly reduces the 
necessary emission reductions outside the ETS and can be implemented by 
setting stricter targets in the NAPs for the second trading period from 2008-
2012. The second measure allows governments to reduce the burden of the 
non-ETS sectors by purchasing larger amounts of CDM and JI credits while 
staying within the limits of the supplementarity criterion. For this reason, the 
provision for restrictions is already made in the EU linking directive that gov-
erns the use of CDM and JI credits within the ETS. The simulations showed 
that a more efficient climate strategy – even given the supplementarity re-
quirement – can achieve the European Kyoto targets at low costs. Compared 
to a “business-as-usual” scenario the welfare in the EU15 is only reduced by 
0.2% compared to 0.9% under the current plans. Finally, even under an opti-
mal allocation of allowances there are distributional issues that need to be re-
solved. Basically, the decision of who is allowed to use the restricted amount 
of CDM and JI credits determines how the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets 
are distributed between the governments and thus tax payers on one side and 
industry on the other side. 
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  38 7. Appendix 
7.1.  Assumptions to Implement the Kyoto and the EU-ETS Targets 
•  Since DART only includes CO2-emissions, we used official emission data 
from the EIA and IEA to calculate the Kyoto target as the CO2 target that 
has to be achieved after planned reductions (see below) in non-CO2 GHG 
are taken into account. The resulting CO2 target is calculated relative to 
2002 CO2-emissions and also implemented in DART relative to 2002 emis-
sions. 
•  Reductions in non-CO2 GHG were taken from NAP were available (Ger-
many -6.9%, UK -40.9%, Netherlands -26.5%, Denmark -6.1%, Finland -
10% relative to 2002 levels). In the remaining EU15-countries as well as in 
Hungary and Poland and OAB a 10% reduction relative to 2002 was 
assumed, which is the median of the available plans. 
•  The allocation of permits to the ETS sectors and the reported historical 
ETS-emissions were used to derive for each country the ETS targets for 
2005-2007 resp. 2012 relative to ETS-emissions in 2002. These targets 
relative to 2002 ETS-emission were implemented in DART, since there is 
not always a perfect match between the DART ETS-emissions and those 
reported in the NAPs. 
•  For the region XCE that does not match the former accession countries 
without Poland and Hungry exactly, it was assumed that emissions in the 
ETS follow the BAU path.  
•  Where available we used targets for 2012 (DEU, DNK, GBR, IRL, NLD). In 
the remaining regions, we assume a reduction of 3% relative to the 2007 
target, which is the median reduction of those plans having a 2012 target. 
•  Data on plans for CDM and JI are taken from Lückge and Peterson (2004). 
  39 7.2. Scenarios  that  were  Run with the DART Model 
Except for the BAU scenario, emission reductions resp. emissions trading al-
ways starts in 2005. The model is run until the year 2012, the end of the first 
commitment period. 
BAU  
•  business-as-usual 
NoCDM  
•  European ETS with targets as indicated above 
•  Uniform, regionally differentiated CO2-taxes in non-ETS sectors in EU25 
to reach individual Kyoto targets 
•  No use of CDM and JI 
•  BAU in all other regions except the EU25. 
LimCDM 
•  Same as NoCDM but use of CDM and JI: full use in ETS and 
governmental use as indicated in NAPs 
•  For the region OAB the use of CDM and JI is limited to 200 MtCO2 p.a.  
•  For CDM and JI credits transaction cost of 3 €/tCO2 are assumed. 
OPT 
•  Same as LimCDM but unrestricted use of CDM and JI both in the ETS 
and on governmental level in the EU25 and the other Annex B regions.  
SUP 
•  Inclusion of all sectors in the European ETS . 
•  The use of CDM and JI is restricted to the supplementarity requirement 
•  For CDM and JI credits transaction cost of 3 €/tCO2 are assumed. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
•  Scenario LimCDM with transaction cost of 0 and 6 €/tCO2. 
 
  40 Table A1: Emissions and Emission Targets in the EU15 
Country  Emissions 2002 in MtCO2e  Emissions in ETS in MtCO2  Allocation to ETS sectors  CDM/JI in 2008-12; MtCO2e p.a. 










Austria  70,5  85.0  67.9  31.7 in 2001  32.1
a          32.7  p.a. ? 4 8.8
Belgium  146,3  150.0  134.3  70.22 in 2007  67.6
b  64.4; 63.1; 62.55  ?  3.56  11.8 
Denmark  54.9  68.0  54.5  30.9 in 2002  30.9  33.5 p.a.   24.7  3.6  17.9 
Finland  54.3  82.0  77.0  40.9 in 2002  40.9  44.9; 45.2; 64.6  ?  0.24  2.4 
France          407.3 554.0 565.0 156.96  in  2001 150.2
a  155 p.a.   ?  ?  11.8 
Germany  838.3  1116.0  986.7  506.5 in 2002  506.5  503 p.a.   495  0.52  58.6 
Greece  104.4  135.0  131.3  70.2 in 2002  70.2  74.4 p.a.   ?  ?  - 
Hungary  56.1  86.0  95.5  29.4 in 2002  29.4  29.9 p.a.  ?  0.0  - 
Ireland          49.1 69.0 59.9 32%  of  total  GHG 22.1
c  22.3 p. a.  20.9  3.7  4.8 
Italy        448.7 554.0 470.6 51%  of  total  GHG
  256.5
c  240.0; 240.6; 241.6  ?  10.0  35.3 
Luxemburg  10.3  11.0  9.4  2.5 in 2001  2.7
a          3.52  p.a. ? 0.6 0.3
Netherlands          256.2 241.0 199.0 84.5  in  2000 86.8
a  98.3 p.a.   95  20.0  17.2 
Poland                    268.4 358.5 530.6 264.2  in  2001 257.2
a 286.2  p.a. ? 0.00 -
Portugal  67.0  82.0  73.7  36.5 in 2002  36.5  38.9 p.a.   ?  0.01  2.9 
Spain  341.5  400.0  327.75  164.3 in 2002  164.3  160.28 p.a.   ?  20.0  26.9 
Sweden  54.9  70.0  74.88  20.2 in 2002  20.2  22.9 p.a.   ?  1.0  1.5 
UK  552.8  635.0  653.0  252.8 in 2002  252.8  152.03 p.a.   145.3  0.0  27.6 
a Assuming same CO2-emission growth in ETS sectors than in whole economy 
b Assuming CO2-emissions growth in ETS sectors from 2002-07 is the same as CO2-emission growth in whole economy from 1997-2002.  
c Assuming that this share holds for 2002. 
d See Lückge and Peterson (2004).   
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